Strategic R&D risk choices of public and private firms by Mingqing Xing
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rero20
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja
ISSN: 1331-677X (Print) 1848-9664 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rero20
Strategic R&D risk choices of public and private
firms
Mingqing Xing
To cite this article: Mingqing Xing (2019) Strategic R&D risk choices of public and
private firms, Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 32:1, 717-741, DOI:
10.1080/1331677X.2019.1578679
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1578679
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 11 Apr 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 486
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Strategic R&D risk choices of public and private firms
Mingqing Xing
School of Economics and Management, and Neural Decision Science Laboratory, Weifang University,
Weifang, 261061, China
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the R&D (research and development) risk
choices of private and public firms in a product differentiated
mixed duopoly market. Using the canonical models of R&D risk
choice in a mixed market, it compares market performances
between Cournot and Bertrand. The main findings are (i) public
firm always engages in higher R&D risks than private firm under
Cournot, (ii) public firm mostly chooses higher R&D risks, but may
choose lower R&D risks than private firm if the degree of product
substitution is sufficiently large under Bertrand, (iii) both public
and private firms are more willing to take R&D risks under
Bertrand than under Cournot, and (iv) from the perspective of
social welfare, private firm always assumes too low R&D risks
under Cournot. However, it takes excessive risks if the degree of
product substitution is large enough under Bertrand.
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1. Introduction
In most (developing as well as developed) countries, state-owned public firms and
private firms coexist and compete against each other in industries such as telecom-
munication, postal service, transportation, automobile, steel, television, banking, hous-
ing, health care, insurance, education and so on (Matsumura & Tomaru, 2015). In
these mixed industries, the private and public firms not only compete in quantity (or
price), but also compete in product (or process) R&D (research and development).
For example, in many countries the public and private firms have fierce R&D compe-
tition in the health care, medicine, biotechnology and energy industries.1 Although in
recent years the literature on mixed oligopoly is increasing, R&D competition in
mixed industries has not attracted enough attention (Ishibashi & Kaneko, 2008).2
This clearly contrasts with the key role of public firms in facilitating innovation and
the development of national innovation systems.3 The optimal choice of R&D
expenditure has been extensively analysed in the R&D literature (d’Aspremont &
Jacquemin, 1988; Boone, 2001; Whalley, 2011; Chen, Nie, & Wang, 2015; Menezes &
Pereira, 2017; and so on). However, from the point view of firm managers, the
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decision may be not just how much to spend on R&D but also how to spend it.4 In
some cases, the main decision may be to choose among R&D strategies with different
degrees of risk (Anderson & Cabral, 2007). Evidence from the telecommunication,
integrated circuit and semiconductor industries in China (or the energy, airlines, rail
and steel industries in many EU (European Union) countries), the public firms are
willing to focus on basic research and the most private firms prefer to invest in appli-
cation research but not basic research. As is known, unlike application research, basic
research has high risk of failure (Nie & Yang, 2015; Xing, 2018). That is, the public
firms are more willing to choose high-risk R&D programmes in these industries.
However, the opposite may be true in some other industries.5 This study examines
strategic R&D risk choice when the private and public firms compete in differentiated
industries. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, the author aims at comparing
the R&D incentives of private and public firms. Second, the author’s objective is
to investigate market performances between Cournot and Bertrand competition.
The last goal is to analyse whether private optimality meets the requirements of
social optimum.
Consider a two-stage game in the context of a mixed duopoly model. In the first
stage, the private and public firms compete in product R&D. The aim of R&D is to
increase market demand. In this stage, given a series of R&D programmes with dif-
ferent risk levels but an identical expected outcome, the firms choose the type of their
R&D programmes (i.e., determine the R&D risk level). In the second stage, the pri-
vate and public firms choose quantities (or prices) and compete in product market. It
is assumed that the firms produce differentiated goods and the public (private) firm
determines its choice variables so as to maximise the social welfare (the profits). This
study mainly finds that: (i) in equilibrium the R&D risk level of the public firm is
always higher than that of the private firm under Cournot competition. However, the
degree of product substitution might reverse the R&D risk choices between public
and private firms under Bertrand competition; (ii) the equilibrium R&D risk level of
both public and private firms under Cournot competition is lower than under
Bertrand competition; (iii) for the private firm, the private optimum of R&D risk is
always lower than the social optimum under Cournot competition, but it is higher
than the social optimum if the degree of product substitution is sufficiently large
under Bertrand competition.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief litera-
ture review and Section 3 describes the basic model. Section 4 solves and then com-
pares (Section 5) the public and private firms’ R&D risk choices and the private and
social optimum of R&D risk under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. Section 6 makes
a comparison of R&D risk level under different types of market competition. The
final section presents conclusions.
2. Literature review
In recent years, strategic R&D competition between private and public firms in mixed
oligopoly has become an increasingly active field of interest (Zikos, 2007). Some
scholars compare R&D spending of public and private firms, but their views are not
uniform. Nett (1994) thinks that the private firm is more innovative than the public
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firm, while Poyago-Theotoky (1998) and Nie and Yang (2015) find that the public
firm invests more into R&D than the private firm. Privatisation is a popular academic
and realistic policy in mixed oligopolies. Several contributors have attempted to
examine the relationship between privatisation and the R&D investment. Cato (2011)
holds that privatisation reduces (increases) the cost-reducing investment if the market
demand is sufficiently large (small); Heywood and Ye (2009) think that the optimal
extent of privatisation is reduced due to the mixed duopolies conduct more R&D;
Zhang (2015) shows that the R&D investment of the public (private) firm decreases
(increases) with the degree of privatisation. Moreover, Buehler and Wey (2010, 2014)
examine the effect of the public R&D on the private R&D in a mixed duopoly and
derive sufficient conditions for the public investment to crow out the private invest-
ment. It is worth noting that the aforementioned studies mainly consider R&D
expenditures in mixed oligopoly. For firm managers, another important decision con-
cerns the risk associated with the R&D programmes.6 Determination of the optimal
R&D risk has received considerable attention in the context of private duopoly.7
However, the issue of R&D risk has not received much attention in the mixed config-
uration. In this study, the author focuses on strategic risk choice of R&D in a mixed
duopoly market. The novelty of this paper is as follows. First, the author compares
the optimal R&D risk choice of public and private firms under both Bertrand and
Cournot competition. The author shows that under Cournot competition the public
firm always engages in higher R&D risks than the private firm, whereas under
Bertrand competition the degree of product substitution might reverse the R&D risk
choices between public and private firms. Second, the author examines the effect of
competition modes on the optimal R&D risk choice and finds that under Bertrand
competition both public and private firms are more willing to take R&D risks than
under Cournot competition.8 Third, the author compares the private optimum and
the social optimum, and gives that relative to the social optimum, under Cournot
competition the private firm always assumes too low R&D risks, whereas under
Bertrand competition it takes excessive risks if the degree of product substitution is
large enough.
3. The basic model
Consider an industry in which a private firm competes with a state-owned public
firm.9 The private firm is assumed to be interested in maximising profit. In contrast,
the public firm is assumed to maximise social welfare.10 The author denotes with sub-
script 1 the private firm and denotes with subscript 0 the public firm. Following
Singh and Vives (1984), the author describes the representative consumer utility func-
tion as follows:
U q0; q1ð Þ ¼ a0q0 þ a1q1 12 q
2
0 þ 2dq0q1 þ q21
 
(1)
In equation (1), qi denotes the quantity of firm i’s production (i ¼ 0; 1), ai (ai>0)
is a positive parameter and d represents the degree of product substitutability. Note
that, lower value of d corresponds to lower (higher) degree of product substitution
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(differentiation). The author assumes that 0<d<1; which excludes the cases that the
firms’ products are perfect substitutes or completely unrelated.11
Given the utility function of representative consumer in equation (1), the resulting
inverse demand function for product i is linear and given by:12
pi ¼ aiqidqj; i; j ¼ 0; 1; i 6¼ j (2)
In equation (2), pi is the price of product i. Thus, the corresponding direct
demand function for product i can be written in the form:
qi ¼ 11 d2 aipid ajpjð Þ
 
; i; j ¼ 0; 1; i 6¼ j (3)
To increase the demand, the public and private firms conduct product R&D,
which is able to shift their demand function upward due to improved product quality.
The effect of R&D on demand function is outlined by:13
ai ¼ aþ xi; i ¼ 0; 1 (4)
In equation (4), xi is the R&D outcome of firm i and a (a>0) is the price intercept
of inverse demand function before R&D.
The profit functions of two firms are listed as follows:
pi ¼ picið ÞqiI li; rið Þ; i ¼ 0; 1 (5)
In equation (5), ci is the marginal cost of firm i and Iðli; riÞ is the cost expense






jri¼0 ¼ 0 and @
2Iðli;riÞ
@ri2
>0 (ri 6¼ 0)15 (see Xing, 2014, 2017).16 In addition, the
R&D outcome (i.e., xi) is assumed to be uncertain (but the firms know its probability
distribution) when the public and private firms engage in product R&D. The prob-
ability distribution of xi is xi½li; ri;17 in which li (li  0) is the expected value and
ri (ri  0) is the variance (i.e., EðxiÞ ¼ li and VðxiÞ ¼ ri)18. Note that, the author
uses the variance of R&D outcome to measure the risk of the R&D programme and
assumes that both public and private firms are risk-neutral (Zhang et al., 2013;
Xing, 2014).19
Social welfare is the sum of the consumer surplus and the firms’ profit, which can
be written as follows:
W ¼ CSþ p0 þ p1 (6)
In equation (6), CS is the consumer surplus.
The author considers a non-cooperative, two-stage game. In the first stage, each
firm undertakes the demand-enhancing R&D and independently chooses the level of
R&D risk.20 In the second stage, the firms produce and simultaneously determine
their quantity (price) under Cournot competition (Bertrand competition). The game
will be solved by the backward induction. That is, the second stage problem is solved
firstly and then the first stage will be considered.
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4. The R&D risk choice under Cournot competition
This section considers the case that the product market involves Cournot competi-
tion. Using equations (2) and (4)–(6), the author obtains the profit function of firm 1
and the social welfare function:
p1 ¼ aþ x1q1dq0c1ð Þq1I l1; r1ð Þ (7)
W ¼ aþ x0c0ð Þq0 þ aþ x1c1ð Þq1 12 q
2
0 þ 2dq0q1 þ q21
 I l0; r0ð ÞI l1; r1ð Þ (8)
In the second stage, the public and private firms non-cooperatively determine their
product quantities. Given x0 and x1; the public firm chooses q0 to maximise social




¼ aþ x1c12q1dq0 ¼ 0 (9)
@W
@q0
¼ aþ x0c0q0dq1 ¼ 0 (10)
Solving equations (9) and (10) for q0 and q1 yields the Cournot–Nash equilib-
rium:22
qC0 ¼
2 aþ x0c0ð Þd aþ x1c1ð Þ
2 d2 (11)
qC1 ¼
aþ x1c1ð Þd aþ x0c0ð Þ
2 d2 (12)
The resulting profit and social welfare are:
pC1 ¼
aþ x1c1d aþ x0c0ð Þ
 2
2d2ð Þ2
I l1; r1ð Þ (13)
WC ¼ 1
2 2d2ð Þ2




þ aþ x1c1ð Þd aþ x0c0ð Þ
 
aþ x1c1ð Þg 2 aþ x0c0ð Þd aþ x1c1ð Þ
 2
2d 2 aþ x0c0ð Þd aþ x1c1ð Þ
 
aþ x1c1ð Þd aþ x0c0ð Þ
 
 aþ x1c1ð Þd aþ x0c0ð Þ
 2I l0; r0ð ÞI l1;r1ð Þ (14)
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In the first stage, the public and private firms choose the type of their R&D pro-
grammes from a series of R&D programmes with different risk levels but a same
expected outcome (i.e., li is a constant and l0 ¼ l1).23 This is equivalent to deciding
on the R&D risk level (variance) (i.e., ri). Using equations (13) and (14), the author
gets the expected profit of firm 1 and the expected social welfare:24
E pC1
  ¼ aþ l1c1d aþ l0c0ð Þ
 2 þ r1 þ d2r0
2d2ð Þ2
I l1; r1ð Þ (15)
E WCð Þ ¼ 1
2 2d2ð Þ2




þ aþ l1c1ð Þd aþ l0c0ð Þ
 
aþ l1c1ð Þg 2 aþ l0c0ð Þd aþ l1c1ð Þ2
h
2d 2 aþ l0c0ð Þd aþ l1c1ð Þ
 
aþ l1c1ð Þd aþ l0c0ð Þ
  aþ l1c1ð Þ½
d aþ l0c0ð Þ2þ 4d2ð Þr0 þ 3d2ð Þr1I l0; r0ð ÞI l1; r1ð Þ (16)
According to equations (2), (5), (11) and (12), the gross profit of firm 0 is PC0 ¼
pC0 þ Iðl0; r0Þ ¼ 0: Therefore, the expected gross profit of firm 0 is equal to 0 (i.e.,
EðPC0 Þ ¼ 0). Combining equations (15) and (16), the author obtains the expected
gross profit of firm 1 (the expected consumer surplus) EðPC1 Þ ¼ EðpC1 Þ þ Iðl1; r1Þ
(EðCSCÞ ¼ EðWCÞEðpC0 ÞEðpC1 Þ), and can thus prove the following results.
Lemma 1. When the firms are involved in quantity competition, (i) the private firm’s
expected gross profit increases with its R&D risk (or the public firm’s R&D risk); (ii)
the public firm’s expected gross profit does not depend on its R&D risk (or the pri-
vate firm’s R&D risk);25 and (iii) the expected consumer surplus increases with the
public firm’s R&D risk (or the private firm’s R&D risk).
Proof. See Appendix.
A numerical example is used to interpret Lemma 1. Consider two alternative pro-
grammes, a low-risk programme (programme A) that yields an R&D outcome 0.1
with probability 1, and a high-risk programme (programme B) that yields an R&D
outcome 0.5 (0) with probability 0.2 (0.8). The expected R&D outcomes of these
two programmes are equal. The intuition behind Lemma 1 is as follows. First, the
author takes the result (i) of the lemma. Under Cournot competition, the inverse
demand function for successful R&D shifts up relative to the inverse demand func-
tion before R&D. Moreover, this shift is greater when the R&D programme is a
high-risk type than a low-risk type. When the private firm chooses the high-risk
programme (given the public firm’s choice) and succeeds, it can obtain more
demand and set a higher price than when it chooses the low-risk programme (see
Table 1 and Table 2). The benefit of R&D success can compensate for the loss
caused by R&D failure. Therefore, the private firm expects to get more gross profits
if it opts for the high-risk programme. In addition, when the public firm opts for
the high-risk programme (given the private firm’s choice) and fails, the private firm
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can have more demand and make a higher price than when it chooses the low-risk
programme (see Table 1 and Table 2). The probability of failure in R&D when the
public firm chooses the high-risk programme is higher than when it chooses the
low-risk programme. Consequently, the private firm expects to get more gross prof-
its when the public firm chooses the high-risk programme. Next, turn to the result
(ii) of Lemma 1. Due to the public firm provides the level of output at which prod-
uct price equals the marginal cost, the public firm’s expected gross profit always
equals zero and is not influenced by its R&D risk choice (or the private firm’s
choice). The third part of Lemma 1 can be interpreted as follows. When the public
firm (the private firm) chooses the high-risk programme (given the private firm’s
(the public firm’s) choice) and succeeds, the aggregate demand is more than when
it chooses the low-risk programme (see Table 1 and Table 2). The increase in aggre-
gate demand leads to an increase in consumer surplus. The increase of consumer
surplus due to R&D success can compensate for the decrease due to R&D failure.
As a result, the expected consumer surplus when the public firm (the private firm)
chooses the high-risk programme is more than when it chooses the low-
risk programme.
Table 1. When d is small, the price, demand, gross profit and consumer surplus (or their expected
values) are shown if firm i (i ¼ 0; 1) chooses the high-risk (or low-risk) programme in Cournot















Firm 1 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.5000 1.2720 1.3534 0.8220 0.0000 0.6757 1.5874
Firm 1 chooses programme B
and fails
0.5000 1.0102 1.4319 0.5602 0.0000 0.3138 1.4228
The expected value when firm 1
chooses programme B
0.5000 1.0626 1.4162 0.6126 0.0000 0.3862 1.4557
The expected value when firm 1
chooses programme A
0.5000 1.0626 1.4162 0.6126 0.0000 0.3752 1.4507
Firm 0 chooses
programme B
Firm 1 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.5000 1.2720 1.3534 0.8220 0.0000 0.6767 1.6079
Firm 1 chooses programme B
and fails
0.5000 1.0102 1.4319 0.5602 0.0000 0.3148 1.4432
The expected value when firm 1
chooses programme B
0.5000 1.0626 1.4162 0.6126 0.0000 0.3872 1.4762
The expected value when firm 1
chooses programme A
0.5000 1.0626 1.4162 0.6126 0.0000 0.3762 1.4712
Firm 1 chooses
programme A
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.5000 0.9997 1.8351 0.5497 0.0000 0.3022 2.1375
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and fails
0.5000 1.0783 1.3115 0.6283 0.0000 0.3947 1.3046
The expected value when firm 0
chooses programme B
0.5000 1.0626 1.4162 0.6126 0.0000 0.3762 1.4712
The expected value when firm 0
chooses programme A
0.5000 1.0626 1.4162 0.6126 0.0000 0.3752 1.4507
Firm 1 chooses
programme B
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.5000 0.9997 1.8351 0.5497 0.0000 0.3132 2.1425
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and fails
0.5000 1.0783 1.3115 0.6283 0.0000 0.4057 1.3096
The expected value when firm 0
chooses programme B
0.5000 1.0626 1.4162 0.6126 0.0000 0.3872 1.4762
The expected value when firm 0
chooses programme A
0.5000 1.0626 1.4162 0.6126 0.0000 0.3862 1.4557
Source: Author.
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Because the firms are uncertain about the outcomes of R&D programmes in the
first stage, the private (public) firm chooses the R&D risk level to maximise its














 @I l0; r0ð Þ
@r0
¼ 0 (18)
Table 2. When d is large, the price, demand, gross profit and consumer surplus (or their expected
values) are shown if firm i (i ¼ 0; 1) chooses the high-risk (or low-risk) programme in Cournot















Firm 1 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.5000 1.0561 1.1636 0.6061 0.0000 0.3674 1.3685
Firm 1 chooses programme B
and fails
0.5000 0.7186 1.4066 0.2686 0.0000 0.0722 1.2974
The expected value when
firm 1 chooses pro-
gramme B
0.5000 0.7861 1.3580 0.3361 0.0000 0.1312 1.3116
The expected value when
firm 1 chooses pro-
gramme A
0.5000 0.7861 1.3580 0.3361 0.0000 0.1130 1.3072
Firm 0 chooses
programme B
Firm 1 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.5000 1.0561 1.1636 0.6061 0.0000 0.3768 1.3907
Firm 1 chooses programme B
and fails
0.5000 0.7186 1.4066 0.2686 0.0000 0.0816 1.3197
The expected value when
firm 1 chooses pro-
gramme B
0.5000 0.7861 1.3580 0.3361 0.0000 0.1406 1.3339
The expected value when
firm 1 chooses pro-
gramme A
0.5000 0.7861 1.3580 0.3361 0.0000 0.1224 1.3295
Firm 1 chooses
programme A
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.5000 0.5917 1.8979 0.1417 0.0000 0.0201 2.0048
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and fails
0.5000 0.8347 1.2230 0.3847 0.0000 0.1480 1.1606
The expected value when
firm 0 chooses pro-
gramme B
0.5000 0.7861 1.3580 0.3361 0.0000 0.1224 1.3295
The expected value when
firm 0 chooses pro-
gramme A
0.5000 0.7861 1.3580 0.3361 0.0000 0.1130 1.3072
Firm 1 chooses
programme B
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.5000 0.5917 1.8979 0.1417 0.0000 0.0383 2.0092
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and fails
0.5000 0.8347 1.2230 0.3847 0.0000 0.1662 1.1650
The expected value when
firm 0 chooses pro-
gramme B
0.5000 0.7861 1.3580 0.3361 0.0000 0.1406 1.3339
The expected value when
firm 0 chooses pro-
gramme A
0.5000 0.7861 1.3580 0.3361 0.0000 0.1312 1.3116
Source: Author.
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Since li is a constant and l0 ¼ l1; the author sets:
h rið Þ ¼
@I li; rið Þ
@ri
; i ¼ 0; 1 (19)








  ¼ 0 (21)
where rCi is the equilibrium R&D risk level of firm i in the mixed duopoly under
Cournot competition.
Comparing the equilibrium R&D risk levels of private and public firms under
Cournot competition, the author can derive the following result.
Proposition 1. For any given d 2 ð0; 1Þ; the public firm’s equilibrium R&D risk level




Proposition 1 implies that, in equilibrium the public firm is more willing to take
risks than the private firm in a mixed duopoly with Cournot competition (see Figure
1).26 This proposition can be interpreted as follows. In general, under R&D competi-
tion, when the private firm determines its R&D risk, it does not take into account the
positive externalities of R&D on the public firm’s expected profit or the expected
Figure 1. The equilibrium R&D risk levels under Cournot competition (when Iðli;riÞ ¼
0:5l2i þ 0:5r2i ; i ¼ 0; 1). Source: Author.
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consumer surplus. However, the public firm cares about both the firms’ expected
profit and the expected consumer surplus and therefore maximises the sum of the
two. Since the public firm’s R&D risk has a positive effect on the sum of its expected
gross profit and the expected consumer surplus under Cournot competition (Lemma
1),27 the public firm is more willing to opt for a higher risk programme than the pri-
vate firm.
Now the author examines the social efficiency of the private incentives on R&D. To
do this, the author considers the choice of R&D risk for a social planner. His/her
objective is to maximise the value of social welfare. Suppose that the social planner
adjusts the R&D investment and the outputs are determined by competition. Because
the outcomes of the R&D programme are uncertain, the social welfare is an expectation
value. The expected social welfare is given in equation (16). Due to the public firm also
maximises the expected social welfare when deciding on its R&D risk, it is in line with
the social planner’s objective. Thus, for the public firm its private optimum of R&D
risk is equal to the social optimum. The author continues to solve the socially optimal






 @I l1; r1ð Þ
@r1
¼ 0 (22)




  ¼ 0 (23)
Figure 2. The private and social optimum of R&D risk for the private firm under Cournot competi-
tion (when Iðli;riÞ ¼ 0:5l2i þ 0:5r2i ; i ¼ 0; 1). Source: Author.
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where rC01 is the socially optimal R&D risk level of the private firm under Cournot
competition.
The comparisons between the private and social optimum of R&D risk for the pri-
vate firm under Cournot competition will be summarised by Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. For any given d 2 ð0; 1Þ; the private firm’s equilibrium R&D risk level





Proposition 2 shows that, from a social-welfare perspective, the equilibrium R&D
risk level for the private firm is too low (i.e., the private firm is willing to assume less
risks than it would be socially optimal) under Cournot competition (see Figure 2).28
In order to increase social welfare, the social planner should encourage the private
firms to undertake R&D programmes with high risk.29 This proposition can be inter-
preted as follows. The private firm does not consider the positive externalities of
R&D on its rival’s expected profit or the expected consumer surplus when deciding
on R&D risk, whereas the social planner cares about both the firms’ expected profit
and the expected consumer surplus and therefore maximises the sum of the two. The
private firm’s R&D risk has a positive effect on the sum of the public firm’s expected
gross profit and the expected consumer surplus under Cournot competition (Lemma
1).30 This induces the private firm to take less risk than the social planner.
5. The R&D risk choice under Bertrand competition
In this section, the author analyses the case that the product market involves
Bertrand competition. In the second stage, the public (private) firm determines price
so as to maximise social welfare (its profit). Using equations (3)–(6), the author gets
the profit function of firm 1 and the social welfare function:
p1 ¼ 11 d2 p1c1ð Þ aþ x1p1d aþ x0p0ð Þ
 I l1; r1ð Þ (24)
W ¼ 1
2 1d2ð Þ2
2 1d2ð Þ aþ x0c0ð Þ aþ x0p0d aþ x1p1ð Þ
 h
þ aþ x1c1ð Þ aþ x1p1d aþ x0p0ð Þ
 g aþ x0p0d aþ x1p1ð Þ
 2
2d aþ x0p0d aþ x1p1ð Þ
 
aþ x1p1d aþ x0p0ð Þ
 
 aþ x1p1d aþ x0p0ð Þ
 2I l0; r0ð ÞI l1; r1ð Þ (25)




1 d2 aþ x1d aþ x0ð Þ þ c12p1 þ dp0
  ¼ 0 (26)




1 d2 c0dc1p0 þ dp1ð Þ ¼ 0 (27)
Solving equations (26) and (27) yields the Bertrand–Nash equilibrium:31
pB0 ¼
d2 aþ x0ð Þ þ d aþ x1ð Þ þ 2c0dc1
2 d2 (28)
pB1 ¼
d aþ x0c0ð Þ þ aþ x1ð Þ þ 1d2ð Þc1
2 d2 (29)
Thus, the resulting profit and social welfare are:
pB1 ¼
aþ x1c1ð Þd aþ x0c0ð Þ
 2
1 d2ð Þ 2d2ð Þ2
I l1; r1ð Þ (30)
WB ¼ 1
2 1d2ð Þ2 2d2ð Þ2
2 1d2ð Þ 2d2ð Þ 2d2ð Þ aþ x0c0d aþ x1c1ð Þ½ 

aþ x0c0ð Þ þ aþ x1c1d aþ x0c0ð Þ
 
aþ x1c1ð Þg 2d2ð Þ aþ x0c0d½
aþ x1c1ð Þ 2d2ð Þ aþ x0c0d aþ x1c1ð Þ½  þ 2d aþ x1c1d aþ x0c0ð Þ
 n o
 aþ x1c1d aþ x0c0ð Þ
 2I l0; r0ð ÞI l1; r1ð Þ (31)
Now let us turn to the R&D decision of public and private firms in the first stage.
Using equations (30) and (31), the author obtains the expected profit of firm 1 and
the expected social welfare:
E pB1
  ¼ aþ l1c1ð Þd aþ l0c0ð Þ
 2 þ r1 þ d2r0
1 d2ð Þ 2d2ð Þ2
I l1; r1ð Þ (32)
E WBð Þ ¼ 1
2 1d2ð Þ2 2d2ð Þ2
2 1d2ð Þ 2d2ð Þ 2d2ð Þ aþ l0c0d aþ l1c1ð Þ
 nh
aþ l0c0ð Þ þ aþ l1c1d aþ l0c0ð Þ
 
aþ l1c1ð Þg 2d2ð Þ
aþ l0c0d aþ l1c1ð Þ
 
2d2ð Þ aþ l0c0d aþ l1c1ð Þ
 n
þ2d aþ l1c1d aþ l0c0ð Þ
 g aþ l1c1d aþ l0c0ð Þ
 2
þ 49d2 þ 7d42d6ð Þr0 þ 36d2 þ 4d4d6ð Þr1I l0; r0ð ÞI l1; r1ð Þ (33)
728 M. XING
According to equations (3), (5), (28) and (29), the author derives the
profit of firm 0 pB0 ¼ d½aþx1c1dðaþx0c0Þ½aþx0c0dðaþx1c1Þð1d2Þð2d2Þ Iðl0; r0Þ: Therefore,
the firm 0’s expected gross profit is given by EðPB0Þ ¼
d½aþl1c1dðaþl0c0Þ½aþl0c0dðaþl1c1Þd2r0d2r1
ð1d2Þð2d2Þ : Combining equations (32) and (33), the
author has the expected gross profit of firm 1 EðPB1 Þ ¼ EðpB1 Þ þ Iðl1; r1Þ and the
expected consumer surplus EðCSBÞ ¼ EðWBÞEðpB0 ÞEðpB1Þ; and then can prove the
following results.
Lemma 2. When the firms are involved in price competition, (i) the private firm’s
expected gross profit increases with its R&D risk (or the public firm’s R&D risk); (ii)
the public firm’s expected gross profit decreases with its R&D risk (or the private
firm’s R&D risk); and (iii) the expected consumer surplus increases with the public
firm’s R&D risk (or the private firm’s R&D risk).
Proof. See Appendix.
The author offers an explanation of Lemma 2 with the help of the numerical
examples in Table 3 and Table 4. In Table 3 (or Table 4), programme A (pro-
gramme B) is a low-risk programme (a high-risk programme), which is the same as
in Table 1 and Table 2. First, the author takes the first part of the lemma. Under
Bertrand competition, the direct demand function of private firm for successful
R&D shifts up relative to that before R&D, and this shift is greater when the pri-
vate firm’s R&D programme is a high-risk type than a low-risk type. When the pri-
vate firm chooses the high-risk programme (given the public firm’s choice) and
succeeds, it can set higher prices (see equation (29)) and will obtain more demand
than when choosing the low-risk programme (see Table 3 and Table 4). Because
the benefit of R&D success can compensate for the loss caused by failure, the pri-
vate firm expects to get more gross profits when opting for the high-risk pro-
gramme. In addition, the probability of failure in R&D if the public firm chooses
the high-risk programme is higher than if it chooses the low-risk programme.
When the public firm opts for the high-risk programme (given the private firm’s
choice) and fails, the private firm can set higher prices and will have more demand
than when the public firm opts for the low-risk programme (see Table 3 and Table
4). Therefore, the private firm expects to obtain more gross profits when the public
firm chooses the high-risk programme. Next, turn to the part (ii) of Lemma 2.
When the public firm chooses the high-risk programme (given the private firm’s
choice) and is successful, it sets lower prices (see equation (28)) and will obtain
more demand than when choosing the low-risk programme. Because the impact of
R&D on the price of public firm is stronger than on its demand, the public firm
expects to get less gross profit when opting for the high-risk programme. When the
private firm opts for the high-risk programme (given the public firm’s choice) and
succeeds, the public firm will set higher prices (see equation (28)) and obtain less
demand than when opting for the low-risk programme. Due to the effect of R&D
on the price of public firm is weaker than on its demand, the public firm expects
to get less gross profit when the private firm choosing the high-risk programme.
These results are different from those in Cournot competition. The result (iii) of
Lemma 2 is interpreted as follows. Under Bertrand competition, if the public firm
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(the private firm) chooses the high-risk programme (given the private firm’s (the
public firm’s) choice) and succeeds, the aggregate demand is more than if it choo-
ses the low-risk programme (see Table 3 and Table 4). Similar to the reason for
part (iii) of Lemma 1, the expected consumer surplus when the public firm (the
private firm) chooses the high-risk programme is more than when it chooses the
low-risk programme.





1 d2ð Þ 2d2ð Þ2
 @I l1; r1ð Þ
@r1
¼ 0 (34)
Table 3. When d is small, the price, demand, gross profit and consumer surplus (or their expected
values) are shown if firm i (i ¼ 0; 1) chooses the high-risk (or low-risk) programme in Bertrand















Firm 1 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.7466 1.2720 1.0824 0.9033 0.2669 0.7425 1.2871
Firm 1 chooses programme B
and fails
0.6681 1.0102 1.2473 0.6156 0.2096 0.3449 1.1977
The expected value when
firm 1 chooses pro-
gramme B
0.6838 1.0626 1.2143 0.6731 0.2211 0.4244 1.2155
The expected value when
firm 1 chooses pro-
gramme A
0.6838 1.0626 1.2143 0.6731 0.2231 0.4123 1.2090
Firm 0 chooses
programme B
Firm 1 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.7466 1.2720 1.0824 0.9033 0.2648 0.7436 1.3096
Firm 1 chooses programme B
and fails
0.6681 1.0102 1.2473 0.6156 0.2075 0.3460 1.2201
The expected value when
firm 1 chooses pro-
gramme B
0.6838 1.0626 1.2143 0.6731 0.2190 0.4255 1.2380
The expected value when
firm 1 chooses pro-
gramme A
0.6838 1.0626 1.2143 0.6731 0.2211 0.4134 1.2315
Firm 1 chooses
programme A
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.6649 0.9997 1.6538 0.6041 0.2728 0.3321 1.8498
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and fails
0.6885 1.0783 1.1044 0.6904 0.2082 0.4338 1.0769
The expected value when
firm 0 chooses pro-
gramme B
0.6838 1.0626 1.2143 0.6731 0.2211 0.4134 1.2315
The expected value when
firm 0 chooses pro-
gramme A
0.6838 1.0626 1.2143 0.6731 0.2231 0.4123 1.2090
Firm 1 chooses
programme B
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.6649 0.9997 1.6538 0.6041 0.2707 0.3442 1.8563
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and fails
0.6885 1.0783 1.1044 0.6904 0.2061 0.4458 1.0834
The expected value when
firm 0 chooses pro-
gramme B
0.6838 1.0626 1.2143 0.6731 0.2190 0.4255 1.2380
The expected value when
firm 0 chooses pro-
gramme A







2 1d2ð Þ2 2d2ð Þ2
 @I l0; r0ð Þ
@r0
¼ 0 (35)
Substituting equation (19) into equations (34) and (35) gives:
1
1 d2ð Þ 2d2ð Þ2
h rB1
  ¼ 0 (36)
49d2 þ 7d42d6
2 1d2ð Þ2 2d2ð Þ2
h rB0
  ¼ 0 (37)
Table 4. When d is large, the price, demand, gross profit and consumer surplus (or their expected
values) are shown if firm i (i ¼ 0; 1) chooses the high-risk (or low-risk) programme in Bertrand















Firm 1 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.9364 1.0561 0.2575 1.2585 0.1124 0.7628 1.0584
Firm 1 chooses programme B
and fails
0.6934 0.7186 1.0050 0.5578 0.1944 0.1498 1.0642
The expected value when
firm 1 chooses pro-
gramme B
0.7420 0.7861 0.8555 0.6979 0.1780 0.2724 1.0630
The expected value when
firm 1 chooses pro-
gramme A
0.7420 0.7861 0.8555 0.6979 0.2070 0.2346 1.0394
Firm 0 chooses
programme B
Firm 1 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.9364 1.0561 0.2575 1.2585 0.0833 0.7824 1.1046
Firm 1 chooses programme B
and fails
0.6934 0.7186 1.0050 0.5578 0.1653 0.1695 1.1104
The expected value when
firm 1 chooses pro-
gramme B
0.7420 0.7861 0.8555 0.6979 0.1489 0.2920 1.1093
The expected value when
firm 1 chooses pro-
gramme A
0.7420 0.7861 0.8555 0.6979 0.1780 0.2542 1.0856
Firm 1 chooses
programme A
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.6021 0.5917 1.6860 0.2943 0.1721 0.0417 1.8220
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and fails
0.7770 0.8347 0.6478 0.7988 0.1795 0.2542 0.9015
The expected value when
firm 0 chooses pro-
gramme B
0.7420 0.7861 0.8555 0.6979 0.1780 0.2542 1.0856
The expected value when
firm 0 chooses pro-
gramme A
0.7420 0.7861 0.8555 0.6979 0.2070 0.2346 1.0394
Firm 1 chooses
programme B
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and succeeds
0.6021 0.5917 1.6860 0.2943 0.1430 0.0796 1.8456
Firm 0 chooses programme B
and fails
0.7770 0.8347 0.6478 0.7988 0.1504 0.3452 0.9252
The expected value when
firm 0 chooses pro-
gramme B
0.7420 0.7861 0.8555 0.6979 0.1489 0.2920 1.1093
The expected value when
firm 0 chooses pro-
gramme A
0.7420 0.7861 0.8555 0.6979 0.1780 0.2724 1.0630
Source: Author.
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where rBi is the equilibrium R&D risk level of firm i in the mixed duopoly under
Bertrand competition.
Let us compare the equilibrium R&D risk levels of private and public firms under
Bertrand competition and then the author can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. There exists a threshold (d# 2 ð0; 1Þ) of d such that (i) when d is
smaller than d# (i.e., 0<d<d#), the public firm’s equilibrium R&D risk level is higher
than that of the private firm under Bertrand competition (rB0>r
B
1 ); and (ii) when d is
larger than d# (i.e., d#<d<1), the public firm’s equilibrium R&D risk level is lower




Proposition 3 states that, in a mixed duopoly with Bertrand competition, the public
firm is more (less) willing to take risks in R&D than the private firm in equilibrium if
the degree of product substitution is sufficiently small (large) (see Figure 3).32 It is an
interesting finding that the degree of product substitution might reverse the R&D risk
choices between public and private firms under Bertrand competition. This is different
from the result in Cournot competition. The intuition behind this proposition is as fol-
lows. The public firm’s R&D risk has a negative effect on its expected gross profit under
Bertrand competition (Lemma 2). This effect is weak if the degree of product substitution
is small enough. In this case, the effect of the public firm’s R&D risk on the sum of its
expected gross profit and the expected consumer surplus is positive.33 Since the private
(public) firm maximises only its expected profit (the sum of firms’ expected profit and
the expected consumer surplus) when deciding on R&D risk, the public firm prefers to
choose a riskier programme than the private firm. However, if the degree of product sub-
stitution is large enough, the public firm’s R&D risk has a strong negative effect on its
expected gross profit and this effect exceeds its positive effect on the expected consumer
surplus. In this case, the effect of the public firm’s R&D risk on the sum of its expected
gross profit and the expected consumer surplus is negative.34 Hence, the public firm pre-
fers to choose a safer programme than the private firm.
Now turn to the situation where the social planner controls the R&D investment.
The author considers the social efficiency of the private incentives on R&D. Suppose
that the pricing is determined by competition. The expected social welfare is given in
equation (33). For the public firm, its private optimum of R&D risk is equal to the





2 1d2ð Þ2 2d2ð Þ2
 @I l1; r1ð Þ
@r1
¼ 0 (38)
Using equations (19) and (38), the author has:
36d2 þ 4d4d6
2 1d2ð Þ2 2d2ð Þ2
h rB01
  ¼ 0 (39)
where rB01 is the socially optimal R&D risk level of private firm under Bertrand
competition.
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Comparing the private and social optimum of private firm under Bertrand compe-
tition, the author can prove the following results.
Proposition 4. There exists a threshold (d# 2 ð0; 1Þ) of d such that (i) when d is
smaller than d# (i.e., 0<d<d#), for the private firm the equilibrium R&D risk level is
lower than the social optimum under Bertrand competition (i.e., rB1<r
B0
1 ); and (ii)
when d is larger than d#; (i.e., d#<d<1), for the private firm the equilibrium R&D




The above proposition implies that, from a social-welfare perspective, the equilib-
rium R&D risk level for the private firm is too low (i.e., the private firm is willing to
assume less risks than it would be socially optimal) if the degree of product substitu-
tion is sufficiently small under Bertrand competition (see Figure 4). However, it is
too high (i.e., the private firm is willing to assume more risks than it would be
socially optimal) if the degree of product substitution is sufficiently large under
Bertrand competition (see Figure 4). To increase social welfare, the social planner
should subsidy private firms who engage in high-risk R&D programmes if the degree
of product substitution is small enough. However, he/she should tax private firms
who undertake high-risk R&D programmes if the degree of product substitution is
large enough.35 Proposition 4 can be interpreted as follows. According to Lemma 2,
the private firm’s R&D risk has a negative effect on the public firm’s expected gross
profit and has a positive effect on the expected consumer surplus under Bertrand
competition. If the degree of product substitution is small (large), the former effect is
weak (strong) and the latter effect is strong (weak). In this case, the effect of the pri-
vate firm’s R&D risk on the sum of the public firm’s expected gross profit and the
expected consumer surplus is positive (negative).36 The social planner cares about
both the firms’ expected profit and the expected consumer surplus and the private
firm only considers its expected profit when they determine R&D risk. Thus, the
social planner prefers the private firm to choose a riskier (safer) programme if the
degree of product substitution is small (large).
6. Comparison
This section presents a comparison of the equilibrium R&D risk levels under
Cournot and Bertrand competition. Using equations (20), (21), (36) and (37), the
author can prove the following results.
Proposition 5. For any given d 2 ð0; 1Þ; in equilibrium the R&D risk levels for both
public and private firms are higher if the product market involves Bertrand competi-








This proposition tells us that, the modes of market competition may affect the
R&D risk choice in a mixed duopoly, and further Bertrand competition makes the
public and private firms more willing to take risks than Cournot competition.37
Proposition 5 can be explained as follows. According to Lemmas 1 and 2, the private
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firm’s R&D risk has a positive effect on its expected gross profit under both Cournot
and Bertrand competition. Since in Bertrand competition case this effect is stronger
than in Cournot competition case,38 Bertrand competition leads the private firm to
choose a riskier R&D programme. In addition, Lemmas 1 and 2 also show that, the
public firm’s R&D risk has a positive effect on the private firm’s expected gross profit
and the expected consumer surplus under Cournot or Bertrand competition, and has








(see Lemmas 1 and 2). Since, compared with
Cournot competition case, the effect of the public firm’s R&D risk on both the pri-
vate firm’s expected gross profit and the expected consumer surplus is greater in
Bertrand competition case,39 this in turn leads to a stronger effect on the sum of the
firms’ expected gross profit and the expected consumer surplus under Bertrand com-
petition.40 Therefore, the public firm takes more R&D risk under Bertrand
competition.
7. Conclusions
The author constructs a two-stage duopoly model with differentiated products, in
which the private and public firms compete in R&D firstly and then in quantity (or
price). The author compares the R&D incentives of two firms under Cournot (or
Bertrand) competition, and finds that in equilibrium the public firm always engages
in higher R&D risks than the private firm under Cournot competition. However, the
degree of product substitution might reverse the R&D risk choices between public
and private firms under Bertrand competition. In addition, the author analyses the
impact of competition modes on the R&D risk choices and concludes that both
Figure 4. The private and social optimum of R&D risk for the private firm under Bertrand competi-
tion (when Iðli;riÞ ¼ 0:5l2i þ 0:5r2i ; i ¼ 0; 1). Source: Author.
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private and public firms under Cournot competition are willing to assume less R&D
risks than under Bertrand competition. Finally, the author examines the social effi-
ciency of private incentives on R&D, and finds that for the private firm its private
optimum of R&D risk is always lower than the social optimum under Cournot com-
petition. However, it exceeds the social optimum if the degree of product substitution
is sufficiently large under Bertrand competition.
This study restricts attention to strategic R&D risk choice of public and private
firms. It is also interesting to investigate how privatisation affects the R&D risk choice
in a mixed duopoly. In addition, the firms are assumed to have multiple R&D pro-
grammes with different degree of risk but an identical expected outcome. A natural
extending is that the firms have multiple R&D programmes with different degree of
risk and different expected outcomes and determine both risk and expected outcomes
in R&D stage. Finally, successful firms are not able to appropriate all of the gains
from the outcomes of their R&D activities if technological spillovers occur in an
industry. Thus, technological spillovers may weaken the firm’s incentive to invest in
R&D. It is important to study the impact of spillovers on the optimal R&D risk
choice. However, such issues must remain for future research.
The main managerial implication is that in mixed duopoly market the private
(public) firm’s optimal decision is to choose safer (riskier) R&D programmes than its
competitor under Cournot competition. Notice, however, that under Bertrand compe-
tition the firms should take the opposite tack if their products have a very high
degree of substitution. This study also highlights that when the private (public) firm
determines its R&D programmes, it should consider the modes of market competi-
tion and choose riskier R&D programmes under Bertrand competition than under
Cournot competition. The practical implication for the social planner is that, when
he/she carries out the R&D policy, the impacts of modes of market competition and
degree of product substitution cannot be neglected. He/she would prefer the private
firm to take more risk under Cournot competition. However, under Bertrand compe-
tition he/she would prefer the private firm to take less risk if the degree of product
substitution is sufficiently large.
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Notes
1. For instance, in the Norwegian oil industry Statoil (a state-owned firm) competes against
Norske Shell (a private firm) in large technological programmes. Statoil is a major
investor in dual cycle energy production system based on fuel cells. Similarly, Norske
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Shell is very active in R&D aimed at the development of energy systems based on SOFC
(solid oxide fuel cells) (Godø, Nerdrum, Rapmund, & Nygaard, 2003).
2. Only a few scholars study the R&D activity in mixed markets (see Poyago-Theotoky,
1998; Ishibashi & Matsumura, 2006; Tomaru, 2007; Heywood & Ye, 2009; Cato, 2011;
Tsai, Wang, & Chiou, 2016).
3. Gil-Molto, Poyago-Theotoky, and Zikos (2011) and Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) point
out that the mixed market literature often ignores that public firms are key players in
R&D-intensive industries such as health care, energy and bio-agriculture and Godø et al.
(2003) provide case studies in the energy sector in European and OECD countries.
4. For example, there are usually different paths to achieve a given level of microprocessor
speed in the microprocessor industry (Anderson & Cabral, 2007).
5. For example, in Chinese mobile phone industry, Huawei (a private firm) is more willing
to engage in a number of high-risk programmes (e.g., smart phone chip and autonomous
mobile operating system) than Lenovo (a public firm); in German pilotless automobile
industry, Bosch, a private firm, prefers to take some riskier R&D programmes (e.g.,
electric power steering system and electronic stabilisation system) than Volkswagen (a
public firm).
6. See some good examples in the studies of Cabral (2003) and Tishler (2008).
7. One line focuses on the choice of R&D risk in patent races, in which the invention time
of technology is the variable of interest (see Klette & de Meza, 1986; Dasgupta & Maskin,
1987; Cabral, 1994; and so on), and the other line assumes that the R&D risk is denoted
by the variance in R&D outcomes and investigates the strategic choice of R&D risk (see
Cabral, 2003; Gerlach, Rønde, & Stahl, 2005; Tishler, 2008; Zhang, Mei, & Zhong, 2013;
Xing, 2014; and so on). It is important to note, though, that these papers only consider
private firms in the standard duopoly and overlook competition between public and
private firms in the mixed configuration.
8. Comparison of Bertrand and Cournot outcomes is of fundamental importance in the
industrial organisation literature. Qiu (1997), Symeonidis (2003), Chen and Nie (2014)
and Lee and Choi (2016) examine the effect of product market competition (Bertrand
and Cournot competition) on R&D investment. However, none of these studies analyse
the impact of product market competition on the R&D risk choices.
9. The models in this paper inherit some features from previous mixed duopoly (or
oligopoly) models (e.g., linear demand functions, utility function, and so on). However,
there are at least three aspects that this study contributes to the existing mixed oligopoly
literature: (i) it introduces the R&D risk variable into the mixed duopoly model and
examines the strategic R&D risk choices; (ii) it considers the R&D risk choices not only
in Cournot mixed duopoly but also in Bertrand mixed duopoly; (iii) it introduces a new
R&D cost function into the mixed duopoly model.
10. Following the mixed duopoly literature (Matsumura & Matsushima, 2004; Cato, 2011;
Kitahara & Matsumura, 2013), we assume that the public firm pursues maximisation
of welfare.
11. The reason we make this assumption is that, we can observe product differentiation in
most industries except for very few industries like power, steel and chemical products
and so on.
12. The detailed derivation process of the inverse demand function is described in
Tondji (2015).
13. Note that the R&D activity is assumed to be perfectly protected against imitation. That
is, this study does not consider the R&D spillovers. This simplifying assumption has the
purpose to show the only effect of product substitution on main propositions (see
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4). However, the R&D spillovers are important factors
affecting the firm’s R&D risk choice. The author will study the impact of R&D spillovers
on the optimal R&D risk choice in mixed oligopoly market in future.
14. The existence of risk may cause a loss to a firm. Harrington and Niehaus (2003) give the
definition of risk cost and define it as the reduction of corporate value as a result of the
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existence of risk. Combining the characteristics of technological innovation risk, Zhu
(2011) gives the definition of the cost of technological innovation risk. She defines it as,
in the process of technological innovation, due to the uncertainty of the risk, an
enterprise’s early investment to avoid possible deviations from expected goals and
possible loss to choose to carry out this innovation. Similar to Harrington and Niehaus
(2003) and Zhu (2011), the author thinks that the existence of R&D risk can bring the
R&D risk cost and gives the R&D cost as a function of the R&D risk and the expected
R&D outcome. Moreover, Liu (2007) gives methods for estimating the loss in technology
innovation risk. However, there is little information in the published literature on the
cost structure of R&D programmes in the case of considering R&D risk.
15. This can guarantee that the second-order conditions for R&D are met and the optimal
solutions of R&D risk are interior (Xing, 2014).
16. It is worth noting that, in works of Xing (2014, 2017), we assume li and ri are additively
separable in Iðli; riÞ: However, this paper does not have such a requirement. Obviously,
the R&D cost function is more general in this paper. In addition, these two works only
examine the R&D risk choices in a private duopoly. Xing (2014) investigates the optimal
R&D risk choices in a private duopoly market exhibiting network externalities, and Xing
(2017) examines the R&D risk choices in a private duopoly market with technology
spillovers. These works do not consider the public firms and compare the R&D incentive
between public and private firms. Thus, they are significantly different from the
application circumstances of this paper in a mixed duopoly.
17. Note that this study uses truncated distribution and assumes xi  0 (i ¼ 0; 1). Thus, the
negative values of R&D what causes that the demand function shifts to the left are
not allowed.
18. The covariance of x0 and x1 is assumed to equal zero in this study.
19. Note that the risk defined in this paper does not coincide with that in utility theory.
20. Although this study only considers demand-enhancing R&D, the main propositions still
hold for cost-reducing R&D.
21. See the study of Han, Heywood and Ye (2017).
22. The second-order conditions are met (i.e., @2p1=@q21 ¼ 2<0 and @2W=@q20 ¼ 1<0)
and the equilibrium in the second stage is locally stable. Moreover, to guarantee the
positive demand for the firms, the author assumes that c0<a; c1<a and jc0  c1j is
small enough.
23. This is a similar assumption as in Tishler (2008), Zhang et al. (2013) and Xing (2014;
2017). However, a natural question is how this specification can be generalised into the
other cases such as ‘oligopolistic’ firms have multiple R&D programmes with different
degree of risk and ‘different’ expected outcomes. The author will extend this analysis in a
further direction.
24. Zemlickien_e, Bublien_e and Jakubavicius (2018) give an advanced tool for verifying
decisions on technology development at early stages of commercialisation.
25. In order to give economic explanations for main propositions more easily, the author
considers the expected gross profit of public firm and further analyses the impact of
R&D risk on it.
26. Some studies make a comparison of the R&D investment levels between public and
private firms. Nett (1994) holds that the private firm has higher incentive to innovate
than the public firm, whereas Poyago-Theotoky (1998) and Nie and Yang (2015) show
that the private firm invests less than the public firm. However, they do not make a
comparison of R&D risk.
27. According to Lemma 1, @EðPC0 Þ=@r0 ¼ 0 and @EðCSCÞ=@r0>0: Thus, @EðPC0 Þ=@r0 þ
@EðCSCÞ=@r0>0: In addition, the author can derive @EðPC0 Þ=@r0 þ
@ EðPC1 Þ=@r0 þ @EðCSCÞ=@r0>@EðPC1 Þ=@r1>0:
28. Zoledowska (2016) discusses the issues related to the existing or required support given
by the State to firms to provide them conditions to innovate.
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29. For example, the social planner subsidies the private firms who engage in the high-risk
R&D programmes. Zikos (2010), Gil-Molto et al. (2011), Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013)
and Lee and Tomaru (2017) investigate R&D subsidies in mixed markets.
30. According to Lemma 1, @EðPC0 Þ=@r1 ¼ 0 and @EðCSCÞ=@r1>0: Thus, @EðPC0 Þ=@r1 þ
@EðCSCÞ=@r1>0: In addition, the author can further obtain
@EðPC0 Þ=@r1 þ @EðPC1 Þ=@r1 þ @EðCSCÞ=@r1>@EðPC1 Þ=@r1>0:
31. The second-order conditions are satisfied (i.e., @2p1=@p21 ¼ 2=ð1 d2Þ<0 and
@2W=@p20 ¼ 1=ð1 d2Þ<0) and the equilibrium in the second stage is locally stable.
32. Combining Propositions 1 and 3, the author knows that whether the public firm is more
willing to take risks than the private firm, depending on market competition and product
characteristics. This can be used to understand why the public firms are more likely to
invest in high-risk R&D programmes than the private firms in some industries, while the
opposite may appear in other industries.
33. According to Lemma 2, @EðPB0 Þ=@r0<0 and @EðCSBÞ=@r0>0: Then, the author can
obtain @EðPB0 Þ=@r0 þ @EðCSBÞ=@r0>0 (@EðPB0 Þ=@r0 þ @EðPB1 Þ=@r0 þ @EðCSBÞ=
@r0>@EðPB1 Þ=@r1) if d is small.
34. The author can obtain @EðPB0 Þ=@r0 þ @EðCSBÞ=@r0<0 (@EðPB0 Þ=@r0 þ @EðPB1 Þ=@r0þ
@EðCSBÞ=@r0<@EðPB1 Þ=@r1) if d is large.
35. Some scholars investigate the imposition of R&D tax on firms (Yang, Liu, & Yang, 2010).
36. That is, @EðPB0 Þ=@r1 þ @EðCSBÞ=@r1>ð<Þ0 if d is small (large). In addition, the author
can derive @EðPB0 Þ=@r1 þ @EðPB1 Þ=@r1 þ @EðCSBÞ=@r1>ð<Þ@EðPB1 Þ=@r1 if d is
small (large).
37. Qiu (1997) and Symeonidis (2003) compare the R&D investment under Bertrand and
Cournot competition in the standard duopoly and show that Cournot competition
induces more R&D effort than Bertrand competition.
38. That is, @EðPB1 Þ=@r1>@EðPC1 Þ=@r1:
39. That is, @EðPB1 Þ=@r0>@EðPC1 Þ=@r0 and @EðCSBÞ=@r0>@EðCSCÞ=@r0:
40. That is, @EðPB0 Þ=@r0 þ @EðPB1 Þ=@r0 þ @EðCSBÞ=@r0>@EðPC0 Þ=@r0 þ @EðPC1 Þ=
@r0þ @EðCSCÞ=@r0:
41. To help readers understand how the author gets the results of simulation, a description is
given in combination with the calculation of qC0 in the first and second parts of Table 1.
However, the calculation of the rest in Table 1 (or the calculation of Tables 2, 3 and 4)
can be similarly given. According to (11), the author can set qC0 ðx0; x1Þ ¼ ½2ðaþ
x0c0Þdðaþ x1c1Þ=ð2 d2Þ: Given firm 0 choosing programme A, (i) if firm 1
chooses programme B and succeeds, the firm 0’s demand is qC0 ð0:1; 0:5Þ1:3534; (ii) if
firm 1 chooses programme B and fails, the firm 0’s demand is qC0 ð0:1; 0Þ1:4319; (iii) if
firm 1 chooses programme B, the firm 0’s expected demand is EðqC0 Þ ¼ 0:2
qC0 ð0:1; 0:5Þ þ 0:8 qC0 ð0:1; 0Þ1:4162; and (iv) if firm 1 chooses programme A, the firm
0’s expected demand is EðqC0 Þ ¼ qC0 ð0:1; 0:1Þ1:4162: In addition, given firm 0 choosing
programme B, (i) if firm 1 chooses programme B and succeeds, the firm 0’s demand is
0:2 qC0 ð0:5; 0:5Þ þ 0:8 qC0 ð0; 0:5Þ1:3534; (ii) if firm 1 chooses programme B and
fails, the firm 0’s demand is 0:2 qC0 ð0:5; 0Þ þ 0:8 qC0 ð0; 0Þ1:4319; (iii) if
firm 1 chooses programme B, the firm 0’s expected demand is EðqC0 Þ ¼ 0:2 0:2
qC0 ð0:5; 0:5Þ þ 0:2 0:8 qC0 ð0:5; 0Þ þ 0:8 0:2 qC0 ð0; 0:5Þ þ 0:8 0:8 qC0 ð0; 0Þ
1:4162; and (iv) if firm 1 chooses programme A, the firm 0’s expected demand is
EðqC0 Þ ¼ 0:2 qC0 ð0:5; 0:1Þ þ 0:8 qC0 ð0; 0:1Þ1:4162:
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B. Proof of Proposition 1: Using equations (20) and (21), hðrC0 ÞhðrC1 Þ ¼ 12ð2d2Þ : There is





C. Proof of Proposition 2: Using equations (20) and (23), hðrC01 ÞhðrC1 Þ ¼ 1d
2
2ð2d2Þ2 : There is
r (r>0) making ðrC01 rC1 Þh0ðrÞ ¼ 1d
2





























E. Proof of Proposition 3: Using equations (36) and (37), hðrB0 ÞhðrB1 Þ ¼ 27d
2þ7d42d6
2ð1d2Þ2ð2d2Þ2 :
There is r̂ (r̂>0) making ðrB0rB1 Þh0ðr̂Þ ¼ 27d
2þ7d42d6
2ð1d2Þ2ð2d2Þ2 : There is d
 2 ð0; 1Þ (d0:7071)
making 27d2 þ 7d42d6>0 if 0<d<d; and making 27d2 þ 7d42d6<0 if d<d<1:
Moreover, h0ðr̂Þ ¼ @2Iðli;riÞ
@r2i
jri¼r̂>0; 1d2>0 and 2d2>0: Thus, rB0rB1>0 when 0<d<d;
and rB0rB1<0 when d<d<1:
F. Proof of Proposition 4: Using equations (36) and (39), hðrB01 ÞhðrB1 Þ
¼ 14d2þ4d4d6
2ð1d2Þ2ð2d2Þ2 : There is &
r (
&
r>0) making ðrB01 rB1 Þh0ð&rÞ ¼
14d2þ4d4d6
2ð1d2Þ2ð2d2Þ2 : There is d
# 2 ð0; 1Þ












1 rB1<0 when d#<d<1:
G. Proof of Proposition 5: Using equations (20) and (36), hðrC1 ÞhðrB1 Þ ¼  d
2
ð1d2Þð2d2Þ2 :
There is ~r (~r>0) making ðrC1rB1 Þh0ð~rÞ ¼  d
2





Using equations (21) and (37), hðrC0 ÞhðrB0 Þ ¼  d
4
2ð1d2Þð2d2Þ2 : There is ½ssmiler
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